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UNITED STATES JUDICIAL SYSTEM--RECENT CHANGE. By an act
passed at the recent session of Congress the Supreme Court is to consist
hereafter of nine judges, six of whom shall be a quorum. The act also
provides for the appointment of a circuit judge in each circuit, with the
same powers as the judges of the Supreme Court now have on circuit.
The Circuit Court is to be held by the judge of the Supreme Court
assigned to the circuit., or the circuit judge, or the judge of the District
Court, or by any two of them sitting together. We do not perceive that
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court is in anywise affected, the sole pur-
pose of this part of the act being apparently to relieve the judges of the
Supreme Court from the pressure of their present circuit duty.
But the feature of the act which attracts special attention is a clause
providing that "any judge of any court of the United States who shall,
after having attained the age of seventy years, and served for the term
of ten years, resign his office, shall thereafter during the rest of his
natural life, receive the same salary which was by law payable to him
at the time of his resignation." This we believe is the first provision
ever made in the United States for a retiring pension for those who
have devoted themselves to the public service. Regarding it as we do,
as a decided step forward in civilization and good government, we trust
that it may be a permanent portion of our judicial system.
MEMBER OF CONGRESS-PRIVILEGE FROm ARREST. Kimber v.
Benjamin F. Butler was an action of assumysit for money which plain-
tiff alleged defendant had illegally compelled him-to pay as rent, while
defendant was in command at Fortress Monroe during the war. The
action was brought originally in the Superior Court of Baltimore, but
removed into the United States Circuit Court, where defendant pleaded
his privilege as a member of Congress in abatement of the action, to
which plea plaintiff demurred. The question was similar to that raised
in Wooley v. Butler, anta, p. 53, and was argued by R. J. Brent and
W. X. Addison, Esqs., for plaintiff, and Hon. Caleb Cushing for General
Butler. CHASE, C. J., held that the privilege of exemption from arrest
means from arrest with a view to i risonment, and does not extend to
exemption from service of summons or other process not involving
detention of the person of defendant. This agrees with the decision of
DOBBIN, J., in Wooley v. Butler, ant, p. 53.
STATE GOVERNMENTS-REORGANIZATION AFTER'THE REBELLION-
ALIENATION OF STATE PROPERTY DURING THE WAR. The State of
Texas v. White et at., in the Supreme Court of the United States, was
an original suit, in which the state of Texas, claimibg certain bonds of
the United States as her property, asks an injunction to restrain the
defendants from receiving payment from the national government, and
to compel the surrender of the bonds to the state.
The United States, by Act of September 9th 1850, offered to the
state of Texas, in compensation for her claims connected with the settle-
ment of her boundary, $10,000,000 in five per cent. bonds, which offer
was accepted by Texas.
One-half of these bonds were retained for certain purposes in the
national treasury, and the other half were delivered to the state.
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The bonds thus delivered were dated January 1st 1851, and were all
made payable to the state of Texas, or bearer, and redeemable after the
31st day of December 1864.
They were received, in behalf of the state, by the comptroller of pub-
lic accounts, under authority of an act of the legislature which, besides
giving that authority, provided that no bond should be available in the
hands of any holder until after endorsement by the governor of the
state.
After the breaking out of the rebellion, the insurgent legislature of
.Texas, on the 11th of January 1862, repealed the act requiring the
endorsement of the governor,' and, on the same day, provided for the
organization of a military board, composed of the governor, comptroller,
and treasurer, and authorized a majority of that board to provide for the
defence of the state by means of any bonds in the treasury, upon any
account, to the extent of $1,000,000.2
The defence contemplated by the act was to be made .against the
United States by war.
Under this authority the military board entered into an agreement
with George W. White and John Chiles, two of the defendants, for the
sale to them of one hundred and thirty-five of these bonds, then in the
treasury of the state, and seventy-six more, then deposited with Droege
& Co., in England, in payment for which they engaged to delivar to the
board a large quantity of cotton cards and medicines. This agreement
was-made on the 12th of January 1862.
On the 12th of March 1862, White and Chiles received from the
military board 135 of these bonds, none of which were endorsed by any
governor of Texas.
Afterward, in the course of the years 1865 and 1866, some of the
same bonds came into the possession of others of the defendants by pur-
chase, or as security for advances of money.
Chief Justice CHASE, on April 12th, delivered the opinion of the
court, holding the following points:-
1. The'word state describes sometimes a people or community of in-
dividuals united more or less closely, in political relations, inhabiting
temporarily or permanently the same country; often it denotes only the
country, or territorial region, inhabited by such a community; not un-
frequently it is applied to the- government under which the people live;
at other times it represents the combined idea of people, territory, and
government.
2. In the Constitution the term state most frequently expresses the
-- combined idea just noticed of people, territory, and government. A
state, in the ordinary sense of the Constitution, is a political commu-
nity of free citizens occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and
organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written con-
stitution, and established by the consent of the governed.
3. But the term is also used to express the idea of a people or politi-
cal community as distinguished from the government. In this sense it
is used in the clause which provides that the United States shall guar-
antee to every state in the Union a republican form of government, and
shall -protect each of them against invasion.
I Acts of Texas, 1862, p. 45. 2 Texas Laws, 1862, p. 55.
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4. The Union of the states never was a purely artificial and arbitrary
relation. It began among the colonies, and grew out of common origin,
mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and geographi-
cal relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the necessities of
war, and received definite form, and character, and sanction, from the
Articles of Confederation. By these the Union was solemnly declared
to "be perpetual." And, when these articles were found to be inade-
quate to the exigencies of the country, the Constitution was ordained
"to form a more perfect Union!'
5. But the perpetuity and indissolubility of the Union by no means
implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of
self-government, by the states. On the contrary, it may be not unrea-
sonably said that the preservation of the states, and the maintenance
of their governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution, as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of
the national government. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks
to an indestructible Union, composed of indestructtile states.
6. When Texas became one of the United States she entered into an
indissoluble relation. The union between Texas and the other states
was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble, as the union between
the original states. There was no place for reconsideration, or revoca-
tion, except through revolution, or through consent of the states.
7. Considered as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance
of secession adopted by the convention, and ratified by a majority of the
citizens of Texas, and all the acts of her legislature, intended to give
effect to that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly with-
out operation in law. The state did not cease to be a state, nor her
citizens to be citizens of the Union.
8. But, in order to the exercise, by a state, of the right to sue in
this court, there.needs to be a state government, competent to represent
the.state, in its relations with the national government, so far, at least,
as the institution and prosecution of a suit is concerned.
9. While Texas was controlled by a government hostile to the United
States, and, in affiliation with a hostile confederation, waging war upon
the United States, no suit instituted .in her name could be maintained
in this court. It was necessary that the government and the people of
the state should be restored to peaceful relations to the United States,
under the Constitution, before such a suit could be prosecuted.
10. Authority to suppress rebellion is found in the power to suppress
insurrection and carry on war; and authority to provide for the restora-
tion of state governments, under the Constitution, when subverted and
overthrown, is derived from the obligation of the United States to
guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of govern-
ment. The latter, indeed, in the case of a rebellion, which involves
the government of a state, and, for -the time, excludes the national
authority from its limits, seems to be a necessary complement to the
other.
11. When slavery was abolished the new freemen necessarily became
part of the people; and the people still constituted the state: for states,
like individuals, retain their identity, though changed, to some extent,
in their constituent elements. And it was the state, thus constituted,
which was now entitled to the benefit of the constitutional guaranty.
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12. In the exercise of the power conferred by the guaranty clause,
as in the exercise of every other constitutional power, a discretion in
the choice of means is necessarily allowed. It is essential only that
the means must be necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the power conferred, through.the restoration of the state to its constitu-
tional relations, under a republican form of government, and that no
acts be done, and no authority exerted, which is either prohibited or
unsanctioned by the Constitution.
13. So long as the war continued, it cannot be denied that the Presi-
dent might institute temporary government within insurgent districts,
occupied by the national forces, or take provisional measures, in any
state, for the restoration of state government faithful to the Union,
employing, however, in such efforts, only such means and agents as
were authorized by constitutional laws. But the power to carry into
effect the clause of guaranty is primarily a legislative power, and resides
in Congress, thougk necessarily limited to cases where the rightful
government is subverted by revolutionary violence, or in imminent dan-
ger of. being overthrown by an opposing government, set up by force
within the state.
14. The several executives of Texas, partially at least, reorganized
under the authority of the President and of Congress, having sanctioned
this suit, the necessary conclusion is, that it was instituted and is prose-
cuted by competent authority.
15. Public property of a state, alienated during rebellion by an
usurping state government for the purpose of carrying on war against
the United States, may be reclaimed by a restored state government,
organized in allegiance to the Union, for the benefit of the state.
16. Exact definitions, within which the acts of a state government,
organized in hostility to the Constitution and government of the United
States, must be treated as valid or invalid, need not be attempted. It
may be said, however, that acts necessary to peace and good order among
citizens, such, for example, as acts sanctioning and protecting marriage
and the domesti6 relations, governing the course of descents, regulating
the conveyance and transfer of property, real and personal, and provid-
in'g remedies for injuries to person an'd estate, and other similar acts,
which would be valid if emanating from a lawful government, must be
regarded in general as valid when proceeding from an actual, though
unlawful government; and that acts in furtherance or support of rebel-
lion against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of
citizens, and other acts of like nature, must, in general, be regarded as
invalid and void.
17. Purchasers of United States bonds issued payable to the state of
Texas or bearer, alienated during rebellion by the insurgent government,
and acquired after the date at which the bonds became redeemable, are
affected with notice of defect of title in the seller.
SIR JAMES PLAISTED WILDE, the Judge of Probate of England, and
Judge Ordinary of the Court of Divorce and Matrimonial Causes, has been
raised to the peerage, and will be known hereafter as Lord PENZANCE.
AMERICAN HEIRS TO ENGLISH EsTATEs.-Hon. J. P. BENJAIIIN,
formerly a senator from Louisiana, then Attorney-General and Secretary
of State of the Confederate States, is now practising law in London,
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whence he has lately written a letter exposing the humbug of getting
up claims in America, of heirship to immense English estates, which
either have no existence whatever, or certainly are not in abeyance
waiting for some unknown American heir to come and take them.
We do not suppose that any reputable American lawyer is likely to
be misled, or to mislead his clients on this subject, but as there seems
to be a considerable popular delusion about it, we are glad to see the
matter quieted by a word from so good a lawyer as Mr. Benjamin.
MEDICAL PRACTITIONERS-LEGISLATION AGAINST QUACKS. We
learn from the _Medical Record of New York, that the state of Minne-
sota has passed an act (March 4th 1869) providing that no person who
has not attended at least two full courses of medical instruction and
graduated at some school of medicine, or who cannot produce a certifi-
cate of qualification from some state or county medical society, shall
practise medicine in any of its departments, or perform any surgical
operation for compensation within the state, and providing a fine of not
less than fifty or more than one hundred dollars for the first violation
of the act, and thirty days' imprisonment for the second. The act also
provides that every practitioner shall, before October 1869, file in the
office of the court of the county in which lie resides a sworn copy of his
diploma or certificate aforesaid, and the omission to do so, shall be
primd facie evidence that lie has not graduated, &c., as required by
the act. The act does not, however, apply to persons practising dentistry
exclusively.
ATTORNEY DISBARRED. Francisg N. Fitch, "an attorney, has been
struck off the rolls by the Supreme Court of New York, in the fifth
judicial district, at Syracuse, January Term 1869, for fraud and mis-
conduct as an attorney.
AGENT-TAKING OF PROFITS ON PRINCIPAL'S MONEY-CUSTOM
NOT VALID AGAINST RULES OF LAW. Minnesota (Jentral Railwaj
Company v. Morgan, in the Supreme Court of New York, December
Term 1868. Defendants, who were brokers in the city of New York,
issued to plaintiff letters of credit on London, to enable plaintiff to pur-
chase iron. As security, defendants received $15,000 in money and a
lien on all iron to be imported, and "on all policies of insurance on such
goods to an amount sufficient to cover the advancements or engage-
ments" of defendants. Defendants suggested insurance of the iron and
were directed by plaintiff to make insurance, which they did by an open
policy in their own name for account of whom it might concern in the
Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., giving their note for the amount of the pre-
mium.
Defendants then submitted a statement of the cost of insurance, and
were directed by plaintiff to deduct it from the $15,000 already de-
posited, and shortly afterwards the parties closed their accounts. Sub-
sequently the insurance company declared a scrip dividend to policy
holders for that year, amounting in this case to 62800. which the com-
pany paid defendants. This was an action by plaintiff for an account
and transfer of the scrip. Defendants claimed to hold the scrip for
their own use, because the policy was issued in their name, and they
gave the premium note, but principally on the ground of the custom of
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agents insuring for others, sanctioned as it was claimed by the New
York Chamber of Commerce, that all dividends should belong to the
agent in lieu of other compensation. The court, per MULLEN, J., held
that the custom was not satisfactorily proved, but, whether it was or not,
no custom could avail against the positive rule of law, that an agent
cannot appropriate to his own use any portion of the profits arising from
the business of the agency.
REVENUE LAW-LANDING OF GOODS WITHOUT PERMIT. United
States v. Twenty Cases of Matches, in the United States District Court
for Wisconsin, yas an information under section 50 of the Act of March
2d 1799, 1 Stat. 665, on a seizure of matches at Milwaukee for being.
unladen at that port from a vessel from Canada, without a permit.
Claimants alleged that the matches were manufactured at Portland,
Maine, and shipped in close packages via the Grand Trunk Railway, a
corporation of Canada, to Chicago, that they were not intended to be
opened between Portland and Chicago, and that the unlading of them
at Milwaukee was without claimant's knowledge or consent. The
Act of March 2d 1861, § 68, 12 Stat. 197, exempts from duty goods
manufactured in the United States, exported to a foreign country, and
brought back in the same condition as when exported. MILLER, D. J.,
held that the goods were subject to forfeiture. "The regulations of
the treasury department relate to the transportation of goods while in
their transit through the foreign country. These regulations may have
been strictly complied with, but they have no relation to the duty im-
posed on the vessel to procure a permit for unlading the matches at the
port of Milwaukee.
"The law under which this information is brought, prohibits the
unlading or delivery of goods, wares, or merchandise brought from any
foreign port or place, whether they be dutiable or not., without the per-
mit of the collector. Nor is it any excuse or defence, that the master
of the vessel put the goods ashore without the knowledge or consent of
the owner or consignee. The revenue laws leave all errors or mistakes
of shippers and carriers to be settled among the parties interested."
CRIMINAL LAW-PuNISHMENT AFTER REPEAL OF STATUTE CREAT-
ING THE OFFENCE-INTERNAL REVENUE. In United States v. Finlay,
in the District Court of the'United States,.Western District of Pennsyl-
vania, defendant was indicted under the Acts of June 80th 1864, sects.
15, 42, and 82, and March 2d 1867, sects. 94 (2 Brightly's Dig. title
Internal Revenue, pl. 27, 48, 140), for making false returns of woollen
manufactures with intent to violate the Internal Revenue Laws.
The tax on woollen goods was repealed by the Act of March 81st
1868. On motion, MOCANDLESS, D. J., quashed the indictment, hold-
ing that after a repeal of the law creating an offence, there is no juris-
diction to punish a violation of the act during its existence: Comm. v.
Duane, 1 Bin. 601.
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE---LIAEILITY ON HIS BOND.
The United States v. Thorn et al., in the United States District Court
of New Jersey, February 1869, was an action on the official bond of a
collector of internal revenue. The declaration averred that defendant
had violated the first condition of the bond, that he shall "faithfully
